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“Our Nation expects and enforces the highest standards of honor and conduct in our
military... Every person who serves under the American flag will answer to his or her
own superiors and to military law, not to the rulings of an unaccountable international
criminal court.”
– President George W. Bush1

Introduction
Although the American military is effectively one of the most potent of
international institutions, discussions of its regulation have been oddly domestic. The
court-martial – the single most important institution for disciplining military forces,
preventing atrocities and punishing offenders – has seen its jurisdiction and procedures
hotly debated, but most often by those in uniform or individuals interested in domestic
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military policy. This paper aims to internationalize the discussion, recognizing that the
discipline of American military forces is of major concern to both international law and
U.S. foreign policy. By exploring the interaction between a major innovation in
international law – the International Criminal Court – and the extensive clemency powers
exercised by military commanders under the laws governing U.S. courts-martial, I hope
to demonstrate that a systematic rethinking of American military justice is now necessary
in light of changed international conditions.
*

*

*

The Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by a vote of 120 to 7
late in the evening of 17 July 1998. For those voting in favor of the final draft, the lack
of unanimity – and the presence of the United States and China among the nations
opposed to adoption – was nearly irrelevant. For them and many prominent NonGovernmental Organizations, the mere existence of such a court would help end impunity
for major crimes against international law, and would act as a permanent deterrent to
despots and tyrants.2

2

See, e.g., Toni Pfanner, “ICRC Expectations of the Rome International Conference,” 322 INTL. REV. RED
CROSS 21 (1998) (“an independent and efficient international criminal court would serve as a serious
deterrent, saving countless persons in the future”); Statement of Louis Michel, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, 11 April 2002 (“[the Court] will act as a deterrent and will help to
promote international humanitarian law and human rights”), available online at:
http://www.diplomatie.be/en/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID=168; Statement by the Permanent
Representative of Chile to the United Nations, Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdes, on behalf of the member
states of the Rio Group, 12 November 2001 (“It is our belief that the Court's establishment will also be a
powerful deterrent against future authors of such atrocities). But see Michael L. Smidt, “The International
Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?,” 167 Mil. L. Rev. 156, 188 (2001) (an offender has
“about as much chance of being prosecuted as ‘winning the lottery’”).

2

The Court as constituted was given substantial powers, as it was intended to have
the teeth to act as a true international court, reliant only tangentially on the United
Nations and certainly independent of any particular state.3
The participants in the Rome Conference recognized that the powers of the court
could invite attempts to capture its authority for political ends. Consequently, a series of
checks on the jurisdiction of the court were integrated into the Court’s statute, including
limits on its territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. The most powerful check on the
new institution, however, was the principle of complementarity: the court would not hear
any case unless the state or states that would have municipal jurisdiction were “unwilling
or unable genuinely” to prosecute the offender.4
Complementarity should be a major cause for relief in the United States. The
U.S. government has consistently argued that the far-flung military obligations of the
United States, and its unique role in global security with the end of the Cold War, make it
uniquely vulnerable to politically motivated prosecutions before the ICC.5 With a halfcentury-old system of military justice dating back to the Second World War and with
roots in British and Roman law, the United States seems well-positioned to avail itself of
the benefits of complementarity.6 Surely, if complementarity is to mean anything, a
system of hundred of uniformed lawyers and judges dedicated solely to policing the
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armed forces must signal an “ability and willingness” to prosecute the grave offenses
within the ICC’s purview.
The United States is justifiably proud of its military justice system. Changes over
its history have taken a discipline-centered system rooted in pre-Revolutionary War
British law and evolved it in the direction of civilian principles of substantive justice.
With the changes inaugurated with the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, an
American court-martial is similar in most respects to a civilian criminal trial.
Nonetheless, military law is rooted in the unit discipline that wins – or loses – wars, and
this concern, central to military prosecution and absent from civilian criminal law, has
been the principal point of contention in debates over the future of military justice.
Traditionally, this dispute has taken the form of a conversation between those who want
greater commander control over courts-martial, believing this will further the aims of unit
cohesion and discipline, and those who favor lessened command influence out of a
concern for the procedural rights of accused servicemembers.7
This paper suggests a different take on this debate. The emergence of the
International Criminal Court and the concept of complementarity provides the possibility
of the U.S. system of military justice being exposed to significant international scrutiny.
If the U.S. invokes complementarity to block an ICC prosecution, it must be prepared to
defend the UCMJ before a world body likely to be skeptical of military justice generally
and the United States’ version in particular. Exhibit A in the international court’s
analysis will be the effectiveness of the U.S. court-martial system and the extent to which
it is viewed as willing to prosecute Americans for atrocities. And a major component
will be the influence those in the accused’s chain of command – and therefore those
7
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potentially implicated in their crimes under the doctrine of command responsibility8 –
have over the selection of charges, conduct of trials, and punishment of the convicted.
While the question can be viewed from many angles, this paper concentrates on
one particular element of command influence in the U.S. military justice system: the right
of a commander to reverse or reduce sentences imposed on convicted servicemembers.
This example is a telling one for several reasons. First, this power does not effect the
conduct or legitimacy of the court-martial itself, but does impact an element of particular
interest to an international court: sentencing and deterrence. Second, unlike many
commander powers that seem to work to the disadvantage of the accused, this power is
generally accepted as a merciful and praiseworthy part of the overall system. While
many of the ways commanders can influence the administration of justice are objected to
on due process grounds, this particular power avoids that challenge. Consequently, it is
one of the less-discussed issues whenever the need for revisions to the UCMJ is
considered. However, because this authority could serve as a procedural shield for
accused servicemembers, it is precisely the sort of command influence most likely to be
thoroughly examined by an international court considering prosecution of an American.
Ultimately, this paper has two goals. First, to suggest that elements of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice should be re-examined not merely from the point of
view of due process, as has been done with great ability,9 but also by considering the
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military justice system’s role as the primary wall between American servicemembers and
trial by the International Criminal Court. Second, this paper is intended to join the
growing chorus of voices10 calling for a systematic review of the U.S. military justice
system with an eye toward its interaction with the international community and
international law.

I. The Context: Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is limited to “the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole.”11 Specifically, the Court has
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression.12 The first three offenses are defined in the Statute itself, and with
the exception of crimes against humanity, are largely uncontroversial. Defining genocide
was particularly simple, as the definition was simply borrowed directly from the
Genocide Convention of 1948,13 a formulation recognized as codifying customary
international law.14

recommendations related to concerns over the ability of U.S. military law to “keep pace with… standards
of procedural justice.” Id. at 2.
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The definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes, however, were more
hotly debated. The definition of crimes against humanity contained in Article 7 of the
Rome Statute is significantly broader than that contained in the oft-cited Statutes of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals.15 Specifically, the list of acts included in Article 7,
paragraph 1 includes rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence as possible actions
triggering the jurisdiction of the Court.16 The list further includes forced transfer of
population, enforced disappearance of persons and apartheid among prohibited acts.17
Such acts, however, must be committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”18 and there must
be “multiple commissions of [the specified act]… pursuant to or in furtherance of a State
or organizational policy to commit such attack.”19 These last requirements significantly
limit the scope of ICC jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, even given the
comparatively broad list of offenses in paragraph 1. Because they must be directed
against a civilian group, and because there must be a state policy to commit such attacks,
it will be comparatively difficult to prove a charge of crimes against humanity. The
numerous elements of the offense, and the evidentiary difficulty of proving them, makes
the successful prosecution of a United States soldier or civilian leader for crimes against
humanity unlikely.
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War crimes, however, do not have these heavy evidentiary requirements, and
consequently the definition of war crimes should be of particular interest to the United
States, with its vast, widely deployed military. The Rome Statute divides war crimes into
four categories:20 “(a) [g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949”;
“(b) [o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law”; (c) [i]n the case of an
armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to
the four Geneva Conventions”; and “(d) [o]ther serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the
established framework of international law.”21 The United States is unlikely to be
responsible for war crimes committed in “armed conflict not of an international
character,” but even the provisions of Article 8 that deal with international conflicts pose
problems. Paragraph (b) borrows heavily from the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, a 1977 update to which the United States is not a party.22 The rules
contained in paragraph (b) severely restrict a state’s discretion to choose means of
combat it considers appropriate to the military situation on the ground by enforcing a
particularly high duty of care toward civilians. While many of the rules derived from the
First Protocol could be considered binding under customary international law, the Rome
Statute still contains innovations -- including a provision prohibiting an occupying power
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from transferring its own people into an occupied territory.23 Similarly, “intentionally
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes…” are outlawed. While protection of religious, art, science or
charitable purposes are based on the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
of 195424 -- to which the United States is not, in any event, a party25 -- the language
protecting educational sites is an innovation suggested by New Zealand and Switzerland
at the Rome Conference itself.26
While similar expansions of the scope of crimes against humanity are tempered
by the requirement that there be multiple acts and they be part of an organized policy,27
this is not true for war crimes. The final language of the Statute states that “[t]he Court
shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.”28 While the Court
is guided to take jurisdiction of a suspected war crime only when part of large-scale
policy, the words “in particular” make it clear that this is not a requirement. The
language does not preclude jurisdiction over a single act defined in Article 8(2), and says
nothing about the rank or status of the person committing that single act.29 Indeed, as a
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severe but legally sound example, the decision by a junior officer to direct fire toward
snipers using a religious structure for cover could serve as a basis for a war crimes
indictment under certain circumstances.30 The lack of textual guidance essentially throws
the entire question back on the Court’s discretion under Article 17(1)(d) to determine
whether a case is of “sufficient gravity to justify” its consideration.
The crime of aggression, the last set forth in the Statute, was not defined. The
Rome Statute essentially punts the question, stating that “[t]he Court shall exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted… defining the crime
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime.”31 Such a definition must take the form of an amendment to the
Statute itself.32 This cannot be proposed until seven years have passed from the entry
into force of the Statute, and must be passed by a two-thirds vote of the States Party.33
Notably strict protections are in place to prevent the majority from forcing an expansion
of the core crimes on a minority. If any state opposes an amendment to the definitions of
crimes found in article 5 through 8, “the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding
a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on

prosecutions to lower-ranking persons must be done “henceforth, if at all, only episodically or
opportunistically.”
30
The Court would be required to find that this order had no “military objectives.” ICC Statute, Article
8(2)(b)(ix). However, the potential political fallout from such a situation is clear, and there is no reason to
believe that international judges with no experience of combat are better qualified than a U.S. court-martial
to decide such a fact-specific question -- especially given the ICC’s very limited resources and the
difficulty of procuring evidence in a combat zone. These are precisely the sorts of concerns that led to
limited ICC jurisdiction in the first place. See Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
“Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor” at pages 2-4 available online at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf (discussing the need to carefully select
targets of investigation given the Office’s limited resources and the difficulties of on-the-ground
investigations).
31
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its territory.”34 This broad exemption significantly undermines concerns that states party
could be “trapped” by an overly expansive definition of the crime of aggression. In
addition, the statute provides that “[i]f an amendment [is] accepted by seven-eighths of
States Parties… any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw
from this Statute with immediate effect.”35 This provides yet another protection for states
party against an overzealous expansion of the definition of crimes within the ICC’s
jurisdiction.
It is essential to note however, that these protections apply only to States Party. If
a party rejects an amendment to the definition of a crime, both its nationals and its
territory are outside the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to that crime. An example
involving two fictional countries may help illustrate the point. If a definition of the crime
of aggression is adopted, and State A were to reject the amendment, its nationals could
not be tried for the crime of aggression regardless of where the crime occurred. On the
other hand, if State A were to accept the amendment the definition would apply to crimes
committed on its territory. If State Y (a non-party) were to commit an act of aggression
on State A’s territory, State Y’s nationals would not be able to avail themselves of the
immunity provision available to a State Party. Rather, the Court’s jurisdiction over
crimes committed on State A’s soil would remain intact. However, if State A had chosen
not to accept the new definition of aggression, State Y’s citizens could not be tried for
any acts of aggression taken on Party’s soil.
The hypothetical reveals another point. Because the Court can only take
jurisdiction over aggression if the state being attacked is a party, states needing the threat

34
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11

of ICC prosecution to secure their territorial integrity are likely to accept whatever
definition is offered. These are also precisely the same states that are likely to push for a
particularly robust definition of aggression. Strong states party will consequently be left
with a choice: accept a robust definition and ICC jurisdiction over their troops abroad, or
reject it, and win immunity for those same troops. Provided a strong state can dispense
with the deterrent effect of ICC jurisdiction over its territory, there is little incentive for it
to accept any definition of the crime of aggression: by rejecting the definition, they win
free use of their troops abroad.36 This is a strong argument for powerful, aggressive
states becoming states party in order to avail themselves of this protection. It is also a
potentially serious flaw in the ability of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over precisely
those states most likely to commit a crime of aggression. It is always possible, of course,
that the whole system is at least implicitly targeted at the only states that can lose out on
this bargain: non-parties.
While much of the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is premised on crimes
defined either by widely accepted treaties or customary law, several concerns remain.
The most pressing is the scope of the war crimes language in the Statute. Combining a
wide range of prohibited acts and minimal checks on the required scope of their
consequences, the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction provides enormous leverage for the
Court to second-guess decisions made in the field. There is nothing, outside of the
Court’s own self-regulation, to prevent a war crimes charge for a single targeting of an
educational institution. Given the likelihood for international outcry over sufficiently
terrible, if honest, mistakes under battlefield conditions, and the necessary lack of
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omniscience in intelligence gathering, the war crimes jurisdiction of the ICC is readymade for a political prosecutor. Similarly, the Crime of Aggression has yet to be defined,
but the mechanisms for its future definition are fraught with potential for gamesmanship,
and should make responsible nations wary of the result.

Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction
The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction may be exercised if “one or more
of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a)

The State on the territory of which the conduct in question
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or
aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;

(b)

The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.

3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under
paragraph 2, that State may… accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with
respect to the crime in question.”37
This jurisdiction is significantly narrower than that suggested by some states. Some
proposed a scheme grounded in the concept of universal jurisdiction, which would have
shackled the Court with very few constraints concerning jurisdiction ratione personam or
ratione territorium.38 Even a more modest Korean proposal, which would have allowed
jurisdiction if a range of states were parties to the statute – the state having custody of the
accused, the state where the crime was committed, the state of the accused’s nationality,
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or the state of the victim’s nationality39 – did not end up in the final draft despite
significant support during the drafting process.40 The final statute seems to reflect a
compromise with the final United States position, which would have allowed jurisdiction
if both the territorial state and the national state of the accused were parties to the
Statute.41 In any event, the final version of the Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over
crimes committed on the territory, or by the nationals, of ratifying states. Consequently,
a state cannot shield its nationals from prosecution for crimes committed on the territory
of another state.42
The Statute does allow states to block ICC jurisdiction under specific
circumstances. First, a state, on becoming a party to the Statute, may invoke a one-time
seven-year immunity against prosecutions for war crimes committed by its nationals or
on its territory.43 Second, and more controversially, Article 98 provides that:
“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.”44
The United States has interpreted this section as allowing for bilateral agreements
whereby a state may promise not to surrender nationals of a foreign state to the Court.45
This is by no means a universally accepted interpretation – the European Union for
instance views such provisions as inconsistent with the “object and purpose” of the treaty,
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ICC Statute, Article 124.
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See, e.g., John R. Bolton, American Justice and the ICC, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 13, 2003, at A21.
40
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and hence invalid.46 While the validity of such agreements has not yet been tested, 17
states47 have concluded Article 98 agreements promising not to surrender U.S. nationals,
suggesting that there is at least some significant support for the United States position.
Finally, the United Nations Security Council – in a nod to its prime responsibility
under the U.N. Charter to safeguard “international peace and security”48 – may block an
investigation or prosecution for a renewable period of twelve months by so
“requesting.”49 This provision has in fact been invoked. On June 30, 2002, the United
States vetoed a resolution extending the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission to
Bosnia.50 In order to lift its veto, the United States demanded an Article 16 resolution
exempting from ICC jurisdiction any peacekeepers of states not party to the Treaty of
Rome.51 After an extensive debate, the Security Council opted to invoke Article 16 to
protect “current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to
the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or
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authorized operation.”52 The Council also expressed an intention to renew the resolution
each year,53 although the resolution was only renewed once.54
While Articles 16 and 98 do provide potential limits to the Court’s jurisdiction,
they rely on specific political action, specifically bilateral negotiations and resolutions of
the Security Council. The greatest and most pervasive check on ICC jurisdiction is,
however, a structural one: the principle of complementarity whereby the Court may
conduct a prosecution for the most heinous offenses against international law if and only
if states are unable or unwilling to do so themselves.
Complementarity is a relatively new principle in international law. The very
word was given a radically new meaning by the International Law Commission in its
Draft Statute,55 where it was first used to connote complementarity between legal
systems.56 The draft’s Third Preambular Paragraph suggested that the Court “be
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures
may not be available or may be ineffective.” In its commentary on this clause, the ILC
noted that the Court would be intended for cases where there would be “no prospect” of
an accused being duly tried in national courts, and that it was not intended “to exclude the
existing jurisdiction of national courts, or to affect that right of States to seek extradition
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and other forms of international judicial assistance under existing arrangements.”57
While any complete exploration of the ILC’s view of complementarity is complicated by
the lack of specific references to it in the actual language of the proposed ICC Statute,
this commentary betrays a relatively unambitious vision of the court: The
recommendation that the ICC be used only where “trial procedures may not be available
or may be ineffective” suggests that only when national courts were unable to prosecute
would the ICC be an appropriate forum. The particularly high bar that there be “no
prospect” of an effective national prosecution would seem to allow states ample
opportunity to hedge and stall the functioning of their judicial machinery without
triggering the Court’s jurisdiction. In essence, the ILC does not appear to have
considered the scenario where a state would actively use its judiciary as a shield against
ICC jurisdiction, or viewed such action without great alarm, and its vision of
complementarity does not, as a result, have the teeth later found in the Rome Statue itself.
Yet, while the ILC’s vision of the Court’s jurisdiction was undeniably weaker
than the Court’s final powers under the Rome Statute, complementarity remains one of
the cornerstones of the ICC regime58 and its central jurisdictional innovation.59 The
Tenth Preambular Paragraph of the ICC Statute proclaims that “the International
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
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jurisdiction.”60 Remedying the defect of the ILC Draft, the Rome Statute spells out the
practical effect of this complementarity in Article 17, under the heading of “Issues of
Admissibility”:
“Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall
determine that the case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely
to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under
Article 20, paragraph 3;61
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court.”62
The statute is clear that national courts have the first right and duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes, and that ICC jurisdiction is available only to
complement that responsibility. But the ICC is empowered to intervene not only where
existing national judicial machinery is insufficient to allow a successful prosecution, but
also where national governments are unwilling to fulfill their responsibility to prosecute.
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Article 17(2) of the Statute gives the Court concrete guidance should it be forced
to evaluate a state’s willingness to prosecute:
“In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider,
having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law,
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court…;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner
which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice.”63
This language preserves the deference to national courts embodied in the “Issue of
Admissibility” section found earlier in Article 17. The standard is set very high: only a
complete refusal to prosecute or a fatally flawed proceeding can defeat the state’s
presumptive right to bar ICC jurisdiction by initiating its own prosecution. Even a
refusal or flawed proceeding may only be ignored if a specific intent element is met: the
state must be acting for the purpose of shielding the relevant individual from criminal
liability. This intent element is most strongly evidenced by the language of 12(2)(c),
where even a biased proceeding may only be branded an “unwilling prosecution” if it is
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.” This question of
the state’s “intent” is therefore central to the ability of the ICC to take jurisdiction of a
case that has already been investigated or prosecuted by a national court.
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While the evidentiary bar is certainly set rather high, the provision remains a
major expansion of the complementarity provision of the Draft Statute since the Court
itself would determine whether a national judiciary’s actions are “consistent with an
intent to bring the accused to justice.” In short, while the statute may seem principally
concerned with protecting national court jurisdiction, in fact it invites the Court to
evaluate national court decisions to a previously unparalleled extent.64 A national
investigation or prosecution prevents ICC jurisdiction only when the ICC itself says it
does.
To summarize and recap, ICC jurisdiction may threaten the United States in
several ways. First, the expansive definitions of the crimes included in the Rome Statute
may impose harsher standards of behavior on United States nationals than those accepted
at present by U.S. officials. Second, as a non-party, the U.S. has no say over any future
definition of the crime of aggression, and it is always possible that it will be defined so as
to implicate actions taken by U.S. forces operating abroad. Third, the ICC’s jurisdiction
over all crimes committed on the territory of states party puts U.S. forces at risk
whenever they operate on such territory. Finally, the principle of complementarity which
is supposed to protect states against unwise or unjust prosecutions by the court is, in
practice, a matter for the discretion of the Court. There is, at bottom, no way to ensure
that Americans will not be exposed to the ICC’s jurisdiction, and thus held to legal
standards that the U.S. cannot control.

United States’ Reaction to the ICC: a Policy of Opposition

64
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The United States’ reaction to these realities of the Rome Statute was at first
mixed. While the United States “had not achieved the silver bullet of guaranteed
protection [for U.S. nationals],” the chief American negotiator at the Rome Conference
argued that a “sophisticated matrix of safeguards” checked the ability of the Court to
initiate politically motivated prosecutions.65 President Clinton chose to sign the Statute
on December 31, 2000 – the last day it was open for signature.66 In doing so, he
expressed hope that “a properly constituted and structured [Court] would make a
profound contribution in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide,” and
emphasized that “the treaty requires that the ICC not supercede or interfere with
functioning national judicial systems”67 However, he noted “significant flaws” –
principally that U.S. personnel could still come under the Court’s jurisdiction without
U.S. ratification – and demanded a “chance to observe and assess the functioning of the
court” before acquiescing to its claimed jurisdiction.68 He characterized the signature as
an opportunity to “influence the evolution of the court” while explicitly declining to
recommend submission of the treaty for Senate ratification.69
The newly elected Bush administration was yet more hostile, evidencing no
interest in cooperating with the Court and specifically disavowing any intention of
becoming party to the Treaty or abiding by the legal consequences of President Clinton’s
signature.70 The Congress was yet more direct: only three days after the Administration
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formally disavowed any connection with the Court, then-House Majority Whip Tom
DeLay introduced the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA).71 Signed into
law later that year, ASPA72 bluntly states that “the United States will not recognize the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over United States nationals.”73
ASPA’s anti-ICC rhetoric comes with impressive enforcement mechanisms.
Section 2004 prohibits any federal, state, or local agency – including courts – from
providing support for or extraditing to the ICC. 74 Similarly, it prohibits agents of the
Court from conducting any investigation on American soil and requires the United States
to:
exercise its rights to limit the use of assistance provided under all treaties and
executive agreements for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, multilateral
conventions with legal assistance provisions, and extradition treaties, to which the
United States is a party, and in connection with the execution or issuance of any
letter rogatory, to prevent the transfer to, or other use by, the International
Criminal Court of any assistance provided by the United States under such treaties
and letters rogatory.”75
ASPA also places severe limitations on when and how American forces may be used
abroad if they may be subject to ICC jurisdiction. In addition to barring any transfer of
intelligence likely to end up in the Court’s hands,76 the United States is prohibited from
giving any military assistance to states party to the Rome Statute.77 This requirement
may be waived by the President if he finds that it is important to the national interest to
71

H.R. REP. NO. 107-62, pt. 1 (May 9, 2001).
American Servicemember’s Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7421-7433, PUB. L. NO. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899
(2002).
73
Id. at § 7421.
74
22 U.S.C. §7423.
75
Id.
76
22 U.S.C. §7425
77
22 U.S.C. §7426. This prohibition does not extend to the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, major non-NATO allies (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, South Korea,
New Zealand), and Taiwan. Id. It is significant that the President is required to investigate the degree to
which American forces may be put at risk of prosecution even while engaged in operations in support of
such close alliances as these, and to take whatever means he may to minimize this danger through
appropriate command and operational control arrangements. 22 U.S.C. §7428.
72

22

do so, or if a foreign state negotiates an Article 98 agreement shielding American forces
from ICC prosecution.78 However, the statute also prohibits absolutely the participation
of U.S. forces in United Nations peacekeeping operations unless either (1) the Security
Council invokes its Article 16 authority in order to shield American troops or, (2) the
countries where U.S. forces will be located do not trigger the Court’s territorial
jurisdiction.79
Finally, and most ominously, 22 U.S.C. §7427 is titled “Authority to Free
Members of the Armed Forces of the United States and Certain Other Persons Detained
or Imprisoned by or on Behalf of the International Criminal Court.” Therein, “the
President is authorized to use all force necessary and appropriate to bring about the
release” of certain American personnel.80 While the Act is careful to eliminate “bribery
or other inducements” from the tools available to the President in securing the release of
a suspect,81 it is difficult to imagine that action to forcibly free a prisoner of the Court
would not be authorized by this section.
The findings of ASPA could not be clearer: the policy of the United States is to
shield American troops from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is
possible that brute American power may be able to accomplish this objective. But it is
also possible that it will not, and in that eventuality the United States may be forced to
78
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think in the Rome Statute’s own terms. For all ASPA’s bluster, the Rome Statute’s
principle of complementarity may provide a cleaner way around the threat of ICC
prosecution: if the United States is willing to undertake a “genuine” investigation and
prosecution of military personnel who commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC,
by its own Statute the Court will be unable to act. Since military personnel are
prosecuted by the military justice system, this poses a question of the ability of that
system to forestall ICC jurisdiction under the Rome Statute. If American military law
provides for the criminalization of behavior prohibited by the Rome Statute, and if the
investigations and prosecutions undertaken by the U.S. military are “genuine” within the
meaning of Article 17, then American troops will likely be beyond the ICC’s reach.82

II. The Problem: Distinctive Elements of the U.S. Court-Martial System
American military justice underwent a sea change between the Second World
War and the Korean conflict. The separate Articles of War and Articles for the
Government of the Navy – passed by the Second Continental Congress and rooted in prerevolution British military law – were supplanted by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ).83 The old Articles were command-centered, with courts-martial viewed
as extensions of the military commander’s disciplinary powers instead of as independent
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tribunals. Their sole purpose was “to secure obedience to the commander”.84 While this
was taken for granted during the early periods of the Republic’s history when the
standing armed forces were small and not generally based near major population centers,
the mobilization associated with World War II and the Cold War made military justice an
issue touching a far greater portion of the population.85 Inevitably, it became a political
issue.86 The UCMJ grew out of a political realization that “discipline cannot be
maintained without justice”, and that the new realities of the service required that justice
be modeled on civilian criminal procedure and its emphasis on due process.87
In response to these concerns, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened a
committee in 1948 under the chairmanship of Professor Edmund Morgan, Jr. of Harvard
Law School.88 The committee was responsible for drafting a code that would be
“uniform in substance and uniform in interpretation and construction”89 that would be
applied to each of the armed services. The result was the Code submitted to the Congress
in 1949, and signed into law in 1950 with only slight modifications.90
The Department of Defense was particularly keen to preserve the efficiency of
“military functions” in the new Code, with special emphasis on the ability of
commanders to maintain discipline in the field.91 The UCMJ established significant
rights for service members accused of crimes and limited commanders’ control over the
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outcome of courts-martial. But it did not eliminate the central role of commanders, since
that role was considered essential to maintaining discipline among service members.
The goal of the UCMJ was to balance this important principle of commander control –
and the resulting unit discipline that separates a modern, responsible army from a rag-tag
militia – with the interests of the accused to a trial according with modern understandings
of due process.92
The Code that resulted from these concerns continues to govern the situation
today, where commanders continue to play an enormous role in the administration of
military justice. They appoint investigating officers; select the court members (the
military equivalent of a jury)93; decide which parties and witnesses get immunity and
review the findings of the court-martial for approval.94
The commander’s extensive authority is tempered by significant constraints.
First, the convening authority is guided by the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, an
attorney trained in military law who reviews and prepares advice for the commander at
each stage of a court-martial. Second, for any serious crime a military judge presides
over the proceedings, ruling on evidence, overseeing the seating of the court members,
and with full authority to dismiss charges for multiplicity or considerations of equity, and
to enter a finding of “not guilty” if he believes that any charge has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.95 Third, the UCMJ provides criminal penalties for unlawful
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command influence over the court-martial96 and allows the military judge to remove a
commander from his duties as the convening authority if he is found to be biased.97
Finally, the U.S. military justice system provides for an extensive appeals process. Any
case resulting in punitive discharge or confinement for a year or more is automatically
appealed to the service Court of Criminal Appeals.98 Further appeals may be heard by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Service, an Article I civilian court with
five judges appointed for 15-year terms99, which is empowered to review the findings of
courts-martial de novo.100 Further review is available to the Supreme Court of the United
States by writ of certiorari. It is worth noting that the Congress had special confidence in
the ability of this appellate hierarchy to temper abuses of command discretion.101

UCMJ Article 60 and Command Clemency
There is significant pressure to further limit the scope of command discretion, but
importantly, almost none of it is directed at commanders’ ability to grant clemency.
Rather, complaints are based in concern for the due process rights of the accused, not out
96

“No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-martial, nor any other commanding
officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof,
with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercises of tis
or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings. No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce
or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any
member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening,
approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts…” UCMJ Article 37.
97
Convening authorities have been removed when there was a perception that their Staff Judge Advocate
was biased (United States v. Johnson-Saunders, 48 M.J. 74 (1998)); where the convening authority had
personally found probably cause and authorized a search (United States v. Wilson, 1 M.J. 694 (1975)); for
potential personal bias (United States v. Hernandez, 3 M.J. 916 (A.C.M.R. 1977)); and for personal
remarks (United States v. Nix, 40 M.J. 6 (C.M.A. 1994). See Essex and Pickle, supra note 87, at 246-247.
98
Art. 66. For a review of the post-conviction procedures available in the United States Military, see James
B. Roan and Cynthia Buxton, “The American Military Justice System in the New Millennium,” 52 AFLR
185, 209-211 (2002).
99
10 U.S.C. 942.
100
Id. The Court has a particular tendency to heavily examine cases before it, including “traditionally
review[ing] meritorious issues that were not assigned by an appellant or his counsel.” United States v.
Ortiz, 24 M.J. 323, 325 (C.M.A. 1987).
101
Essex and Pickle, supra note 87, at 5.

27

of worries that crimes are being under-prosecuted. The most extensive and authoritative
criticism of the role of commanders under the UCMJ came out of a commission created
by the National Institute of Military Justice under the chairmanship of Senior Judge
Walter T. Cox, III, who had recently stepped down from the position of Chief Judge of
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.102 The so-called Cox Commission’s report
criticized the extent of command decision-making in the court-martial process, with
special emphasis on the selection of the court members.103 The concerns largely center
on the “impression of unfairness created by the role of convening authorities in military
justice.”104 The Report referred to the current practice whereby commanders appoint the
members of the court as “an invitation to mischief [insofar as it] permits – indeed,
requires – a convening authority to choose the persons responsible for determining the
guilt or innocence of a servicemember who has been investigated and prosecuted at the
order of that same authority.”105 Finally, the Report opined that “[t]he combined power
of the convening authority to determine which charges shall be preferred, the level of
court-martial, and the venue where the charges will be tried, coupled with the idea that
this same convening authority selects the members of the court-martial to try the cases, is
unacceptable in a society that deems due process of law to be the bulwark of a fair justice
system.”106 While largely concerned with the rights of the accused, the Report still noted
that “in order to maintain a disciplinary system as well as a justice system commanders
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must have a significant role in the prosecution of crime at courts-martial.”107 The Report,
and similar complaints,108 point yet again to the fundamental tension between the role of
commanders as the sources of battlefield discipline, and the need for an independent
justice system that protects the accused.
This balance can be found throughout the UCMJ,109 but is perhaps most striking
in the case of Article 60.110 There, the convening authority111 is given authority to set
aside any finding of guilt by a court-martial, change a finding of guilt on a particular
charge to a guilty verdict on a lesser charge, or downwardly modify any sentence
imposed by the court-martial.112 This absolute clemency power is exercised as a “sole
command prerogative,”113 but may only be used to the advantage of the accused.114 This
is its only constraint.
Article 60 gives a very broad discretion to commanders. While they already are
tasked with convening courts-martial (and are given the implied authority to choose not
to do so) it is quite another thing to allow them to simply disregard the findings of a duly
107
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constituted judicial panel. In the civilian context, such authority is granted only to the
chief executive (the governor in the case of state offenses, or the President for federal
crimes). Even there, the power is granted not by statute, but as a constitutional
prerogative rooted in the historical role of the monarch.115 Here, it is an institutional part
of the process: the accused has a right to seek review by the convening authority, whose
decision must be guided and informed by a report prepared for the purpose – a significant
investment of judicial resources that underscores the centrality of command review of
courts-martial. Similarly, while traditional executive clemency is centralized in the chief
constitutional executive, here it is devolved at least to the level of a brigade or fleet/base
commander. Thus, taking the example of the United States Navy, well over 100 officers
have statutory authority to convene courts-martial, and thus Article 60 authority to nullify
the findings thereof116 – and this number could be expanded substantially by order of the
Secretary of the Navy.
Most of the concerns over the UCMJ have been with its procedural fairness for
the accused. While command discretion does present concerns, little has been said about
this institutionalized ability of commanders under the UCMJ to shield those under their
command from criminal prosecution.117 While the ability of commanding officers to
maintain discipline and unit effectiveness by summarily punishing their subordinates has
been tempered, they retain their ability to govern morale and unit cohesion through the
judicious use of leniency. Put simply, the UCMJ’s procedural innovations may have
rendered the commander’s stick less sturdy, but his carrots remains intact.
115
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Commanders’ Discretion and the Danger of ICC Prosecution
A Commander’s discretion in matters of military discipline, firmly rooted in the
history of military governance, has potentially enormous ramifications for international
criminal law. As discussed above, the International Criminal Court is required to defer to
investigations or prosecutions undertaken in good faith by governments. In the military
context, however, even a good faith prosecution comporting in every way with the letter
and spirit of the half-century-old UCMJ will implicate command discretion.
How, then, should this command discretion be characterized? The closest parallel
appears to be pardons. In international law pardons are issued after a person has been
found guilty of criminal conduct.118 They remove the punishment attached to a finding of
guilt – sometimes after a portion of a sentence has been served. Convening authority
action fits this model well: a court-martial has already publicly passed on the guilt of a
defendant before Article 60 even comes into play. The central question, then, is whether
pardons are consistent with the statute of the ICC. If they are, then the Court will likely
defer to an Article 60 action, and consider itself precluded from trying the underlying
case. If not, the ICC will view any court-martial where the convening authority invokes
Article 60 as potentially not a “genuine prosecution” within the meaning of the Rome
Statute’s complementarity provision.
The Rome Statute makes no reference to the possibility of pardons or other forms
of clemency such as amnesties. This is a stunning omission given the significant debate
over the role of amnesties and similar actions in post-conflict states – and related
concerns over the possibility of impunity for those involved in serious crimes in those
118
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states and globally.119 During the drafting of the Rome Statute, attempts to gain ICC
jurisdiction over cases involving paroled, pardoned, or amnestied defendants were not
successful.120 Some states believed that the Court should not be allowed to intervene in
the political decisions of a State, whereas others did not believe a specific provision was
necessary.121 These latter believed that the Court had sufficient authority under the Rome
Statute’s admissibility standards to review cases where an amnesty or pardon was
undertaken in “bad faith.”122 While some states’ ratification instruments especially
reserved the right to issue amnesties123, the result is that the Rome Statute has no explicit
rules on the subject.
However, the text of the admissibility standards does give some guidance. Article
17 can be read as stating that the Court “shall determine that a case is inadmissible
where… [t]he case is being investigated.” This would suggest that, at a minimum, if a
state fails even to investigate a charge the case would be admissible. Of course, pardons
in general follow not only an investigation, but an actual finding of guilt. This is
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especially true in an UCMJ Article 60 context. The Court’s jurisdiction over a defendant
benefiting from command clemency could not, therefore, be based on this reading of
Article 17.
Similarly, the ne bis in iden provisions of the Rome Statute’s Article 20 provide
that “no person who has been tried by another court… shall be tried by the [International
Criminal Court] with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other
court” were intended to shield the defendant from criminal liability.124 This provision
clearly put the emphasis on the actual proceeding that led to conviction. Since a pardon
follows such a conviction, the actual proceeding may have indeed been conducted with
the intention of securing conviction and punishment, only to have a later action mitigate
that punishment. Read strictly, if the proceeding itself were legitimate and genuine, the
ICC would be powerless to act.
Two points, however, suggest otherwise. First, the entire thrust of the Rome
Statute is to prevent states from shielding persons responsible for the gravest crimes from
criminal responsibility. The Court may very well choose not to read Article 20 so
strictly. It can do this in one of two ways: by reading the term “proceeding” broadly to
include the appellate and executive action taken on a case, or by reading a subsequent
pardon as evidence of the lack of required intent to bring the accused to justice.125 This
last interpretation may be mitigated if the authority overseeing the trial itself is separate
from that granting a pardon – as, for example, in a system of divided powers such as the
United States’ civilian courts.126 But in the context of Article 60, the UCMJ runs into a
serious problem on this front: because the convening authority both exercises control
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over the proceedings (by selecting the court members, choosing the charges, etc.) and
grants clemency, concerns that the underlying proceedings were intended simply to lead
to a pardon and, thus, defeat ICC jurisdiction are at the very least conceivable.127
The Court, then, will have to fashion a rule in this area. Its judges should be
guided first by the suggestions outlined above, namely, that the text and history of the
Rome Statute suggest that the criminal proceeding itself should be the focus of the court’s
inquiry. This is especially true since the Court must look to whether a state court’s
proceedings were conducted according to “the principles of due process recognized by
international law.”128 While states have an independent responsibility to prosecute those
responsible for certain crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court (or extradite them to
others to try them)129 it should be noted that there are few areas where this is true.130
Importantly, the Court should be informed by the common presence of pardoning powers
in the municipal legal systems of states. Thus, while the Court’s duty to look at
international standards of due process is only one factor to which the Court must “have
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regard” in determining a case’s admissibility, that factor can be seen as weighing in favor
of honoring pardons.
However, the teleological arguments from the Rome Statute remain powerful: the
ICC was clearly intended to punish the worst individual offenders of international law.131
Interpretations that make this impossible are likely to be rejected by the Court. But it
should be remembered that the Court must determine whether a particular crime is “not
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.”132 Given the likely severe
constraints on its resources, the Court will have to be careful in selecting cases of
“sufficient gravity,” a standard that allows the ICC significant discretion in managing its
own docket.
The Court should consider the advantages of trial followed by pardon, including
the truth-finding role played by trials, the clear and unambiguous condemnation of the
underlying behavior by a competent tribunal, and the real costs to the accused that flow
from public conviction. A finding that a person committed serious crimes in the context
of war will have a serious effect, will create precedent within the state, and will serve as a
deterrent to others who do not want to undergo the ordeal that a public trial on such
charges involves. A trial followed by pardon, especially pardon that simply reduces
rather than eliminates the sentence, is a far sight better than simple impunity. The Court
may well see this as a significant enough difference – especially given the concerns
outlined above concerning the emphasis on the proceedings instead of the result, and the
prevalence of pardons in municipal legal systems – to concentrate its efforts on cases
where no reasonable trial was undertaken, no condemnation was made, and no costs
131
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accrued to the lawbreaker. This is especially attractive in the arena of military law
where, in addition to the above concerns, issues of unit cohesion, command
responsibility, and military discipline support the use of a wider clemency power than is
available in a civilian context.
On the other hand, the United States must realize that allowing the convening
authority both significant control over the court-martial itself and the right to take postconviction action conflates clemency with the original proceeding. This undermines any
argument based on the Rome Statute’s concentration on the legitimacy of the underlying
proceeding by contaminating it with the subsequent clemency action. Amending the
Uniform Code of Military Justice to require that someone other than the convening
authority exercise article 60 powers, or by giving the professional Judge Advocates
General corps (which operates on a separate chain of command from field officers)
greater control over the actual court-martial in such key areas as charge and courtmember selection, would go a long way towards ensuring that the ICC will decline
jurisdiction over cases where UCMJ Article 60 has been invoked. Consequently, such
changes would help bring American military law into line with the rapidly developing
demands of international criminal law while simultaneously having the least effect on the
principles of command responsibility, unit cohesion, and military discipline that serve a
special role in the government of military forces.

Conclusion
Traditionally, the level of command influence over U.S. courts-martial has been
the result of a compromise. On one hand, commanders argued that their ability to
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discipline members of their units was central to unit effectiveness and cohesion. On the
other, considerations of humanity and democratic sensitivities argued strongly for a more
robust view of military due process. The creation of an International Criminal Court lifts
this debate out of its traditional domestic context and injects considerations of
international law and the politics of international institutions. If the United States is to
give effect to its strong policy of avoiding ICC jurisdiction, it must continue to pursue a
range of political and diplomatic strategies. Among these should be an attempt to find
safe harbor in the complementarity principle central to the Court’s international role.
Such a strategy may require us to rethink the terms of our domestic debate over the role
of commanders in military justice.
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